Abstract-A Universal Designated Verifier Signature (UDVS) scheme is an ideal mechanism for preventing any signature holder from arbitrarily disseminating the signature, so as to protect the privacy of original signer. Such schemes are suitable for applications like the certificate of medical records and income summary, etc. In this scheme, a signature holder (designator) can generate a designated verifier signature which can only be verified by an intended verifier. Additionally, the verifier cannot transfer his proof to any third party, since he is also capable of simulating a computationally indistinguishable transcript. In this paper, the author proposes a new ID-based non-interactive UDVS scheme based on the assumption of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP). To ensure the security of proposed scheme, the requirement of strong unforgeability is formally proved in the random oracle model. Compared with previous works, our mechanism also provides better functionalities.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first public key system was introduced by Diffie and Hellman [1] in 1976. Such a cryptosystem provides two important mechanisms, i.e., encryption and digital signatures [1] - [5] . The former ensures confidentiality while the latter guarantees integrity, authenticity [6] and non-repudiation [7] . A digital signature is generated with the signer's private key so that anyone can verify it with the signer's corresponding public key. There are two types of digital signatures including deterministic [2] and probabilistic [5] . A probabilistic signature scheme employs random numbers into the process of signature generation. Consequently, an identical message can always produce different signatures for each signing process.
To protect the privacy of some special applications, e.g. electronic votings [8] , [9] , a signature should only be verified by some designated persons rather than anyone. In 1990, Chaum and Antwerpen [10] introduced the so-called undeniable signature scheme in which the signature must be verified with the assistance of signer. That is to say, a verifier has to obtain signer's agreement for verifying his signatures, so as to assure the privacy. In 1996, Jakobsson et al. [11] further addressed the concept of non-interactive designated verifier proof and hence proposed a designated verifier signature (DVS) scheme eliminating the property of non-repudiation. In this scheme, a designated verifier's public key is incorporated with the DVS generation process, so that the verifier has the ability to simulate a computationally indistinguishable transcript with his private key, which is referred to as transcript simulation. Such property also results in the fact that only the designated verifier will believe the originality of received DVS, as he has no way to convince any third party of his proofs. It can be seen that the privacy issue is guaranteed in the DVS scheme without any interactive procedure and the signer is unnecessary to be involved in the signature verification process.
Nevertheless, some security flaws of Jakobsson et al.'s scheme were pointed out by both Wang [12] and Saeednia et al. [13] in 2003, respectively. The latter also introduced the Strong Designated Verifier Signature (SDVS) scheme which prevents anyone except for the designated verifier from validating the signature, since it requires the designated verifier's private key for performing the verification procedure. The next year, Susilo et al. [14] presented identity-based SDVS scheme with complete security proofs. Since then, several SDVS schemes [15] - [18] have been proposed.
Consider the case of some privacy-preserving applications where the signer and the signature holder could be different persons. To fulfill such application requirements, Steinfeld et al. [19] , [20] further extended SDVS into Universal Designated Verifier Signature (UDVS) scheme. In a UDVS scheme, a signature holder (also called designator) can encrypt the publicly verifiable signature with a designated verifier's public key and the generated UDVS can only be verified with the assistance of the designated verifier's private key. A UDVS also exhibits the property of non-transferability which makes that it is difficult for a designated verifier to persuade any third party of his conviction, since he is capable of simulating a computationally indistinguishable transcript intended for himself.
Based on the assumption of Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem (SDHP), in 2005, Zhang et al. [21] proposed a UDVS scheme without random oracles. In 2008, Huang et al. [22] addressed another UDVS scheme using the assumption of Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (GBDHP). In 2009, Chen et al. [23] extended Hess signature and Cha-Cheon signature into UDVS schemes, respectively. In this paper, the author will propose a new UDVS scheme based on the ID-Based Non-Interactive Universal Designated Verifier Signature for Privacy-Preserving Applications
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II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first describe security notions and the computational assumptions which will be used in the proposed scheme.  Bilinear Pairing Let (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ) be two groups of the same prime order q and e: G 1 × G 1 → G 2 a bilinear map which satisfies the following properties: 1) Bilinearity:
2) Non-degeneracy: If P is a generator of G 1 , then e(P, P) is a generator of G 2 . 3) Computability:
Given P, Q  G 1 , the value of e(P, Q) can be efficiently computed by a polynomial-time algorithm.  Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem; BDHP The BDHP is, given P, aP, bP, cP
 Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial F() and all sufficiently large k, the algorithm A can solve the BDHP with an advantage of at most 1/F(k), i.e.,
The probability is taken over the uniformly and independently chosen instance and over the random choices of A. 
III. PROPOSED UDVS SCHEME
In this section, we state involved parties and algorithms of our UDVS scheme and then give a concrete construction.
A. Involved Parties
A UDVS scheme has three involved parties: a signer, a designator (signature holder) and a designated verifier. Each party is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine (PPTM). The signer will generate a PV-signature and send it along with the message to a designator. After validating the PV-signature, the designator further creates a designated verifier signature (DV-signature) and delivers it together with the message to the designated verifier. Consequently, the DV-signature can only be verified by the designated verifier with his private key. Besides, the designated verifier cannot transfer the conviction to any third party, since he is also capable of generating another computationally indistinguishable transcript.
B. Algorithms
We describe composed algorithms as follows:  Setup: Taking as input 1 k where k is a security parameter, the algorithm generates the system's public parameters params.  PV-Signature-Generation (PSG): The PSG algorithm takes as input the system parameters params, a message and the private key of signer. It generates a PV-signature 
C. Construction
We give a concrete construction of our scheme as follows:  Setup: Taking as input 1 k , a trusted authority (TA) selects two groups (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ) of the same prime order q where |q| = k. Let P be a generator of order q over G 1 , e: G 1  G 1  G 2 a bilinear pairing and h 1 : G 1  G 2 and h 2 : {0, 1}*  G 2  Z q collision resistant hash functions. The system publishes the public parameters params = {G 1 , G 2 , q, P, e, h 1 , h 2 }. The key pair of TA is set as (s, P TA = sP) and that of each user U i is (S i = sQ i , Q i = H 1 (ID i )).  PV-Signature-Generation (PSG): Let U a be a signer.
For signing a message m  R {0, 1}*, U a chooses r  R Z q to compute
The PV-signature for the message m is  = (R, V).
 PV-Signature-Verification (PSV): To check the validity of the PV-signature  = (R, V), anyone can verify whether
If the quality holds, the PV-signature is valid. We show that the verification of Eq. (3) 
and then deliveries the DV-signature
If the quality holds, the DV-signature is valid. We show that the verification of Eq. (6) Which leads to the left-hand side of Eq. (6).
IV. SECURITY PROOF AND EVALUATION
In this section, we first prove unforgeability and non-transferability of our proposed UDVS schemes in the random oracle model and then compare our scheme with previous works. 
chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) in the random oracle model if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
A that can break the BDHP with a non-negligible probability.
Proof: We use the Forking Lemma introduced by Pointcheval and Stern [24] to prove this theorem. Suppose that a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can forge a valid DV-signature of our proposed UDVS scheme with a non-negligible advantage under the adaptive chosen message attack after asking at most q hi h i random oracle (for i = 1 and 2) and q PSG PSG queries. Then we can construct another algorithm B that breaks the BDHP with a non-negligible advantage by taking A as a subroutine. Let all involved parties and notations be defined the same as those in Section III. The objective of B is to obtain e(P, P) abc by taking (P, aP, bP, cP) as inputs. In this proof, B simulates a challenger to A in the following game.
Setup: The challenger B runs the Setup(1 k ) algorithm to obtain the system's public parameters params = {G 1 , G 2 , q, P, e} and comes up with a random tape composed of a long sequence of random bits. Then B sets P TA = aP and simulates two runs of the proposed scheme to the adversary A on input (params, P TA ) along with the random tape. 
Combining the above two equalities, we have 
Consequently, B could solve the BDHP by computing Proof: To generate a DV-signature * intended for himself, any designated verifier first chooses R'  R G 2 and U'
Here, ' = (R', U', T') is a valid DV-signature for m. The generated ' is computationally indistinguishable from the received . To be precise, the probability that the computed ' = (R', U', T') and the received  = (R, U, T) are identical is at 
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new UDVS scheme for privacy-preserving applications. The underlying security assumption is the well-known Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) which is believed to polynomial-time intractable. The proposed scheme exhibits all necessary requirements for a secure UDVS scheme. The security proof of strong unforgeability against EF-CMA adversary is also realized in the random oracle model. Moreover, our scheme is a non-interactive proof system, i.e., the designated verifier can solely verify the UDVS without any assistance. As compared with previous schemes, ours also owns better functionalities, which helps with practical implementation.
